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Abstract. In this paper we propose an ontological model for document-
ing provenance of MQTT message brokers to enhance the transparency
of interactions between IoT agents.
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1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) enables multiple heterogeneous devices and applica-
tions to interact with each other using the Internet as a common communication
infrastructure. However, these devices bring with them a new set of problems
such as security and user data/identity privacy [1]. The concurrent operation of
such devices leads to a high risk of data breach where a device capable of com-
plex computations can launch an active or a passive attack in a network running
weak security protocols [2]. Alongside this, the increasing interest of IoT users in
data privacy and new regulations for protecting personal data such as the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation1 and the Safe Harbor Framework2 necessitate
greater transparency of IoT systems. This includes user-accessible information
on processes utilising the data generated/obtained through IoT devices.
We argue that transparency of interactions between IoT devices (e.g. ex-
changing of messages) is a critical enabler to support IoT device accountability,
privacy, and data quality assessments. Here, the W3C recommendation PROV
[5] could provide means to document causal relationships between agents (i.e.
things, data consumers, etc.), activities they perform (e.g. sensing, relaying mes-
sages), and data entities used and generated. In addition, by documenting the
? The work described here was funded by the award made by the RCUK Digital Econ-
omy programme to the University of Aberdeen (EP/N028074/1) and City, University
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1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/LSU/?uri=CELEX3A32016R0679
2 https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/u.s.-eu-safe-
harbor-framework
intended actions of agents (i.e. plans) we could also support audit of IoT com-
ponents in terms of system capabilities and deviations in behaviour.
In this context, message brokers implementing the MQTT standard3 are
commonly used to network groups of IoT devices and software agents4. In such
networks all communication between clients can be inspected by auditing the
connected message brokers. At the same time, malfunctions, misconfigurations
or the limited capabilities of message brokers (e.g. not detecting abnormal be-
haviour such as repeated failed authentication attempts) pose significant security
and privacy risks that may result in data loss or breach of data sharing permis-
sions. Provenance records documenting the intended and actual behaviour of
message brokers could support discovery of such issues. For example, a prove-
nance query could reveal a list of all agents that had access to a redistributed
message which can be checked against a user’s policy for data sharing. Further
queries could also identify messages that are not being forwarded by the bro-
ker (i.e. plans not executed in full), frequent attempts at unauthorised client
subscriptions, or clients that are frequently disconnected due to their inactivity
without properly closing their connections.
In the remainder of the paper we introduce the MQTT-PLAN ontology, de-
signed to define plans describing the intended actions of brokers upon receipt
of different types of MQTT control packets. This can then be used to annotate
retrospective provenance records of the broker’s actual behaviour, identifying
correspondances between the retrospective entities and activities and concepts
in the plan. We conclude with a discussion of outstanding challenges and outline
our future work.
2 The MQTT-PLAN Ontology
MQTT-PLAN5 defines a vocabulary extending PROV-O6 and P-PLAN [3] to
describe high level abstract plans associated with MQTT brokers; and their cor-
responding execution traces. The ontology captures information that could be
found by inspecting individual MQTT control packets (e.g. message topics) and
other information maintained by a broker (e.g. the identity of clients subscribed
to receive messages published to each topic, and reasons for client disconnec-
tions). In P-PLAN, plans are modelled as sets of variables serving as inputs
and outputs of steps. Execution traces are then described using the concepts
p-plan:Entity and p-plan:Activity7 which are linked to the corresponding plan
via p-plan:correspondsToVariable and p-plan:correspondsToStep. This approach
3 http://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v3.1.1/os/mqtt-v3.1.1-os.html
4 MQTT is a publish/subscribe messaging transport protocol for a client-server com-
munication. The protocol specifies a set of control packets that govern the commu-
nication between the client and the message broker residing on a server.
5 http://w3id.org/mqtt-plan
6 https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/
7 Subclasses of prov:Entity and prov:Activity.
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Fig. 1. Main MQTT-PLAN concepts modelled as subclasses of P-PLAN concepts.
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Fig. 2. An example provenance record describing a broker’s plan for re-publishing
received messages to other clients, and a record of the corresponding execution trace.
allows for a separation of the abstract plan description from individual execu-
tion traces describing instances of enacted processes and associated data. As
a result, the interpretation of retrospective provenance is bound to the corre-
sponding plan description. Fig 1 illustrates the main MQTT-PLAN concepts8.
A step m-plan:BrokerAction can be triggered by m-plan:ControlPacket and its
more descriptive subtypes such as m-plan:PublishCP, m-plan:SubscribeCP, etc.
Subtypes of m-plan:BrokerAction such as m-plan:Subscribe9, m-plan:Publish10,
m-plan:Disconnect11 are also defined. Control packets can be associated with m-
plan:PacketAttribute(s) such as m-plan:TopicName and m-plan:Message. Using
property chain axioms associated with m-plan:hasActionInput such attributes
are inferred as input variables of the m-plan:BrokerAction. A broker action can
produce an m-plan: ActionResult variable, which describes a results object and
can also trigger another m-plan:BrokerAction step. Such results can be associ-
ated with attributes m-plan:Target, m-plan:Reason and m-plan:CompletionStatus.
Subtypes of m-plan:Target, namely m-plan:AffectedAgent and m-plan: AffectedA-
8 MQTT-PLAN concepts are described with the prefix m-plan.
9 The client sending a control packet triggering this action should be registered to
receive messages published under the requested topics.
10 A message specified in the control packet triggering this action should be forwarded
to clients subscribed to the topic under which it was published.
11 This action should close the connection between a client and a broker.
gents define variables which can be instantiated via a retrospective provenance
record to describe either a single or group of agents affected by the activity in-
stance corresponding to m-plan:BrokerAction. Fig 2 illustrates an example plan
describing re-publishing of messages by a message broker and a corresponding
execution trace. In this example, a message containing a temperature reading
was published under the topic “/temp” by the client ex:Device1 and was for-
warded to the client ex:Device2 by the agent ex:Broker.
Similarly, m-plan:CompletionStatus and mplan:Reason can be instantiated
via the retrospective provenance record to determine whether the broker could
complete the activity and the reason if this was not possible. For example, a
publish control packet could trigger a publish action which could not complete
due to the client being denied access to the topic. A result of this action could
also trigger disconnection of the client.
3 Discussion and Future Work
In order to keep the vocabulary lightweight, the initial version of the ontol-
ogy does not cover all of the functionalities specified in the MQTT standard.
These include: quality of service tracking, handling of will messages, retaining
of messages by the broker, session flags. Username and password flags are also
not captured explicitly for security reasons. However, the ontology enables mod-
elling of various plans describing single or multiple broker actions interlinked
with their input and output variables. As part of our future work we aim to
create a repository of common representations of broker’s plans described us-
ing MQTT-PLAN to generate further community discussions about their use.
We will also evaluate how the lack of support for conditional branches impacts
on modelling such plans. Finally, traffic managed by message brokers presents
scalability challenges. However, our previous work [4] demonstrated a possible
approach using linked data streams. We are currently exploring a means for cap-
turing provenance by extending an open source MQTT message broker in order
to evaluate the potential of a stream-based approach for consuming such data.
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